Paper Info
Title
Ex post implementation
Abstract
We analyze the problem of fully implementing a social choice set in ex post equilibrium. We identify an ex post monotonicity condition that is necessary and—in economic environments—sufficient for full implementation in ex post equilibrium. We also identify an ex post monotonicity no veto condition that is sufficient. Ex post monotonicity is satisfied in all single crossing environments with strict ex post incentive constraints.
Year
DOI
Venue
2008
10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.006
Games and Economic Behavior
Keywords
DocType
Volume
C79,D82
Journal
63
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
2
0899-8256
4
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.78
0
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
John Geanakoplos112929.52
Stephen Morris212454.64