Title
Spatial reciprocity for discrete, continuous and mixed strategy setups
Abstract
The existence of cooperation in the social dilemma has been extensively studied based on spatial structure populations, namely, the so-called spatial reciprocity. However, vast majority of existing works just simply presume that agents can offer the discrete choice: either the cooperative (C) or defective (D) strategy, which, to some extent, seems unrealistic in the empirical observations since actual options might be continuous, mixed rather than discrete. Here, we propose discrete, continuous and mixed strategy setups in the social dilemma games and further explore their performance on network populations. Interestingly, it is unveiled that there is actually considerable inconsistency in terms of equilibrium among different strategy games. Furthermore, we reveal how different cooperative arrangements among these three strategy setups can be established, depending on whether the presumed dilemma subclass is a boundary game between prisoner's dilemma game and Chicken game or between prisoner's dilemma game and Stag-Hunt game.
Year
DOI
Venue
2015
10.1016/j.amc.2015.03.018
Applied Mathematics and Computation
Keywords
Field
DocType
evolutionary game,network reciprocity,spatial structure,strategy setup
Simultaneous game,Mathematical economics,Mathematical optimization,Strong reciprocity,Simulation,Repeated game,Game theory,Symmetric game,Normal-form game,Superrationality,Non-cooperative game,Mathematics
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
259
C
0096-3003
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
6
0.55
14
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Satoshi Kokubo1222.74
Zhen Wang2106085.86
Jun Tanimoto38516.08