Title
On the Interplay between Games, Argumentation and Dialogues.
Abstract
Game theory, argumentation and dialogues all address problems concerning inter-agent interaction, but from different perspectives. In this paper, we contribute to the study of the interplay between these fields. In particular, we show that by mapping games in normal form into structured argumentation, computing dominant solutions and Nash equilibria is equivalent to computing admissible sets of arguments. Moreover, when agents lack complete information, computing dominant solutions/Nash equilibria is equivalent to constructing successful (argumentation-based) dialogues. Finally, we study agentsu0027 behaviour in these dialogues in reverse game-theoretic terms and show that, using specific notions of utility, agents engaged in (argumentation-based) dialogues are guaranteed to be truthful and disclose relevant information, and thus can converge to dominant solutions/Nash equilibria of the original games even under incomplete information.
Year
DOI
Venue
2016
10.5555/2936924.2936964
AAMAS
Keywords
Field
DocType
Argumentation,Dialogues,Games
Mathematical economics,Computer science,Argumentation theory,Artificial intelligence,Game theory,Nash equilibrium,Machine learning,Complete information
Conference
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
1
0.36
21
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Xiuyi Fan19813.18
Francesca Toni21844123.95