Title
Scepticism And Epistemicangst, Redux
Abstract
Part one offers aprecisof my book, EpistemicAngst(Princeton UP, 2015), with particular focus on the themes discussed by the participants in this symposium. Part two then examines a number of topics raised in this symposium in light of thisprecis. These include how best to understand the 'non-belief' account of hinge epistemology, whether we should think of our hinge commitments as being a kind of procedural knowledge, whether hinge epistemology can be used to deal with underdetermination-based scepticism, what the status of my acceptance of the closure principle amounts to, whether one's total evidence in fact supports our hinge commitments, and the nature of the kind of reasoning that Wittgenstein employs when advancing a hinge epistemology. Finally, I offer some remarks on the notion of epistemic risk in the context of the sceptical problematic, and show how this has application to legal epistemology.
Year
DOI
Venue
2021
10.1007/s11229-019-02504-2
SYNTHESE
Keywords
DocType
Volume
Epistemological disjunctivism, EpistemicAngst, Hinge epistemology, Radical Skepticism, Wittgenstein
Journal
198
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
SUPPL 15
0039-7857
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
1
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Duncan Pritchard133.89