Title
Automatic generation of sources lemmas in TAMARIN: Towards automatic proofs of security protocols
Abstract
TAMARIN is a popular tool dedicated to the formal analysis of security protocols. One major strength of the tool is that it offers an interactive mode, allowing to go beyond what push-button tools can typically handle. TAMARIN is for example able to verify complex protocols such as TLS, 5G, or RFID protocols. However, one of its drawback is its lack of automation. For many simple protocols, the user often needs to help TAMARIN by writing specific lemmas, called "sources lemmas", which requires some knowledge of the internal behaviour of the tool. In this paper, we propose a technique to automatically generate sources lemmas in TAMARIN. Following the intuition of manually written sources lemmas, our lemmas try to keep track of the origin of a term by looking into emitted messages or facts. We prove formally that our lemmas indeed hold, for arbitrary protocols that make use of cryptographic primitives that can be modelled with a subterm convergent equational theory (modulo associativity and commutativity). We have implemented our approach within TAMARIN. Our experiments show that, in most examples of the literature, we are now able to generate suitable sources lemmas automatically, in replacement of the hand-written lemmas. As a direct application, many simple protocols can now be analysed fully automatically, while they previously required user interaction.
Year
DOI
Venue
2022
10.3233/JCS-210053
JOURNAL OF COMPUTER SECURITY
Keywords
DocType
Volume
Formal verification, Tamarin prover
Journal
30
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
4
0926-227X
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Véronique Cortier100.34
Stéphanie Delaune200.68
Jannik Dreier300.34
Elise Klein400.34