Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Decision rules for Yes–No voting systems are placed in a probabilistic framework. Selfdual and permutationally invariant distributions
are introduced. Under such distributions, the mean success margin of the majority rule and of the unanimity rule are shown
to bound the mean success margin of all other decision rules. For bloc decision rules in the Penrose/Banzhaf model, a product
formula for the voters’ influence probabilities is derived. Other indices and the Shapley/Shubik model are also discussed. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2010 | 10.1007/s00355-010-0450-0 | Social Choice and Welfare |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
decision rule,majority rule | Decision rule,Welfare economics,Admissible decision rule,Unanimity,Mathematical economics,Voting,Binary decision diagram,Invariant (mathematics),Probabilistic logic,Majority rule,Mathematics | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
35 | 3 | 1432-217X |
Citations | PageRank | References |
1 | 0.43 | 3 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Olga Ruff | 1 | 1 | 0.43 |
| Friedrich Pukelsheim | 2 | 36 | 9.32 |