A Game-Theoretic Analysis on the Conditions of Cooperation in a Wireless Ad Hoc Network
To enable proper functioning of wireless ad hoc networks, all nodes in the network are expected to cooperate in forwarding each otherýs packet. But relaying other nodesý packets involves spending energy without getting any immediate revenue. Hence, due to the constraints on available energy the nodes usually have in such networks, from an individual nodeýs point of view, the best response is always not to cooperate. We model this problem as a repeated game and show analytically that given a suitable punishment mechanism, individual nodes can be deterred from their selfish behavior, and cooperation can emerge as the best response. We also show that generosity by other nodes cannot be part of a credible deterrent mechanism.
game-theoretic analysis,show analytically,available energy,selfish behavior,proper functioning,suitable punishment mechanism,best response,immediate revenue,individual node,credible deterrent mechanism,wireless ad hoc network,repeated game,intelligent networks,routing,degradation,throughput,mobile ad hoc networks,ad hoc networks,computer networks,game theory
Mobile ad hoc network,Computer science,Network packet,Best response,Computer network,Repeated game,Game theory,Wireless mesh network,Wireless ad hoc network,Throughput,Distributed computing