Title
Equality of opportunity, moral hazard and the timing of luck.
Abstract
Equality of opportunity is usually defined as a situation where the effect of circumstances on outcome is nullified (compensation principle) and effort is rewarded (reward principle). We propose a new version of the reward principle based on the idea that effort deserves reward for it is costly. We show that luck can be introduced in two ways in the definition of these principles, depending on whether the correlation between luck and circumstances should be nullified and whether the correlation between luck and effort should be rewarded. In this regard, the timing of luck with respect to effort decisions is crucial, as is exemplified by moral hazard where effort choice influences the lottery of future uncertain events.
Year
DOI
Venue
2017
10.1007/s00355-017-1054-8
Social Choice and Welfare
Field
DocType
Volume
Welfare economics,Economics,Actuarial science,Compensation principle,As is,Moral hazard,Lottery,Timeline,Luck
Journal
49
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
3-4
0176-1714
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Arnaud Lefranc100.34
Alain Trannoy2318.69