Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Several resource allocation problems involve multiple types of resources, with a different agency being responsible for "locally" allocating the resources of each type, while a central planner wishes to provide a guarantee on the properties of the final allocation given agents' preferences. We study the relationship between properties of the local mechanisms, each responsible for assigning all of the resources of a designated type, and the properties of a sequential mechanism which is composed of these local mechanisms, one for each type, applied sequentially, under lexicographic preferences, a well studied model of preferences over multiple types of resources in artificial intelligence and economics. We show that when preferences are O-legal, meaning that agents share a common importance order on the types, sequential mechanisms satisfy the desirable properties of anonymity, neutrality, non-bossiness, or Pareto-optimality if and only if every local mechanism also satisfies the same property, and they are applied sequentially according to the order O. Our main results are that under O-legal lexicographic preferences, every mechanism satisfying strategyproofness and a combination of these properties must be a sequential composition of local mechanisms that are also strategyproof, and satisfy the same combinations of properties. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2021 | 10.5555/3463952.3464092 | AAMAS |
DocType | Citations | PageRank |
Conference | 0 | 0.34 |
References | Authors | |
0 | 5 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sujoy Sikdar | 1 | 11 | 3.93 |
| Xiaoxi Guo | 2 | 0 | 1.69 |
| H. Wang | 3 | 84 | 15.66 |
| Lirong Xia | 4 | 1034 | 86.84 |
| yongzhi cao | 5 | 63 | 10.56 |